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Abstract: In Religious Experience, Wayne Proudfoot argued that a tout court rejection of reductionism 
in accounts of religious experience was not viable. According to Proudfoot, it’s possible to distinguish 
between an illegitimate practice of descriptive reductionism and the legitimate practice of explanatory 
reductionism. The failure to distinguish between these two forms of reductionism resulted in a protective 
strategy, or an attempt to protect religious experience from the reach of scientific explanation. Among the 
theorists whom he accused of deploying this illegitimate strategy Proudfoot included William James and 
his work in The Varieties of Religious Experience. In this article, I argue that while James does occasionally 
deploy a protective strategy in Varieties, this is not the only nor most important method of treating religious 
experience James developed. Implicit in his rejection of medical materialism, James not only deploys the 
protective strategy Proudfoot criticizes, but the pragmatic method with which he treats all claims. I argue 
that James’s pragmatic method leads to what James called noetic pluralism, or the view that there is no 
privileged knowledge practice, but a plurality of knowledge practices, and that this method puts pressure 
on the explanatory reductionist, who is implicitly committed to noetic monism.
Keywords: William James, Philosophy of Religion, Religious Experience, Explanation, Pluralism
1  Introduction
In the opening lecture to The Varieties of Religious Experience, “Religion and Neurology,” William James 
confronts what he calls “medical materialism,” or the view that religious experience can be reduced to the 
causal relations of physiological processes.1 Examples of medical materialism in practice include claims 
like “Alfred believes in immortality…because his temperament is so emotional;” “Fanny’s extraordinary 
conscientiousness is merely a matter of over-instigated nerves;” and “William’s melancholy about the 
universe is due to bad digestion.”2 The result, James says, is that
Medical materialism finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the 
occipital cortex, he being an epileptic. It snuffs out Saint Teresa as an hysteric, Saint Francis of Assisi as an hereditary 
1 James, Varieties, 20. 
2 Ibid., 18. 
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degenerate. George Fox’s discontent with the shams of his age, and his pining for spiritual veracity, it treats as a symptom 
of a disordered colon.  Carlyle’s organ-tones of misery it accounts for by a gastro-duodenal catarrh. All such mental over-
tensions, it says, are, when you come to the bottom of the matter…due to the perverted action of glands which physiology 
will yet discover.3 
The problem with this view, according to James, is that “an existential account of facts of mental history 
[cannot] decide in one way or another…their spiritual significance.”4 For one thing, all “states of mind 
[have]…some organic process as its condition.”5 To determine the spiritual significance of a claim, James 
suggests that one must judge the claim “[b]y their fruits…not by their roots.”6 Given this “empiricist 
criterion,” James suggests that etiological accounts of an episode are irrelevant, and that medical material 
cannot debunk the pretenses of religious experience simply by invoking these kinds of considerations.7 
In Religious Experience, Wayne Proudfoot critiques James for developing this position. He observes 
a tension between James’s claim that religious experience should be “assessed without regard to how 
that experience is to be explained” and the claim that religious experiences are “characterized by a noetic 
quality.”8 For Proudfoot, the claim that religious experiences involve “a noetic quality” suggests that 
these experiences have “the epistemic status of a hypothesis.”9 This being the case, “certain explanatory 
commitments are presupposed by the experience.”10 So, if the experience is to be regarded as veridical, 
these commitments must be plausible, or true. The problem is that this view of matters challenges James’s 
suggestion that “interest in causes and assessment of value [are] two entirely different orders of inquiry.”11 
“To describe [an] experience is to cite” the explanatory commitments involved in the noetic quality of 
the experience.12 Thus, Proudfoot concludes that James’s distinction between existential and spiritual 
judgments is untenable. 
 In what follows, I don’t intend to challenge Proudfoot’s claim that James is committed to the illegitimate 
protective strategy that Proudfoot describes,13 but I do intend to challenge the claim that this is the only 
strategy James employs in Varieties. In my interpretation of James’s critique of medical materialism, there 
are three distinct argumentative routes. First, there is James’s attempt to eliminate etiological considerations 
from examinations of experiential episodes. Second, there is the claim that when veridical and non-
veridical experiences share etiological conditions, these conditions do not bear on the veridicality of the 
experiences. Third, there is the claim that medical materialism relies on an antecedent, unarticulated, and 
undefended commitment to what James calls “noetic monism.”14 These argumentative routes are important 
to distinguish between for several reasons. First, the presence of the second and third argumentative routes 
suggests that James’s case against medical materialism cannot be dismissed simply on the grounds that 
it involves an illicit protective strategy. Second, the third argumentative route suggests that reductionists 
about religious experience cannot simply distinguish between descriptive and explanatory reductionism, 
as Proudfoot does, in the construction of their skeptical treatments of religious experience. That’s because, 
third, the claim that noetic monism needs to be defended, rather than assumed, suggests that there might 
not be one best description or even explanation of a religious experience. If so, the explanatory reductionist 
will not be able to get hold of their explanatory target in the first place – let alone hit that target. Thus, the 
explanatory reductionist will not have made an advancement beyond the medical materialist, and James’s 
critique of the latter will put considerable pressure on the former as well. 
3 Ibid., 20. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 25. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Proudfoot, Religious, 158.
9 Ibid., 163. 
10 Ibid., 158. 
11 Ibid., 165. 
12 Ibid., 158. 
13 See also Hollinger, “Damned”, and Kitcher, “A Pragmatist’s” for critical discussion. 
14 James, Pragmatism, 81. See also Levinson, The religious.
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To develop this case, I work through each of the argumentative routes in turn. I first examine James’s 
use of the empiricist criterion and the distinction between existential and spiritual judgments it supports. 
I argue that Proudfoot is right to criticize this distinction, and that it is a distinction James himself should 
reject, given his later formulations of both pragmatism and radical empiricism. I then examine the second 
argumentative strategy James explores, the suggestion that etiological conditions cannot imply that an 
experience was not veridical when those conditions are present in any experience. I argue that this is a 
better objection against medical materialism, but that it leaves James open to the kind of critical work 
currently being done on evolutionary debunking arguments inspired by research in the cognitive science 
of religion (CSR).  I leverage some Jamesian considerations in support of some theistic responses to these 
arguments, but I argue that while religious belief is rational in the face of these debunking arguments, 
James’s second strategy does not do much work in this case. Thus, I turn to James’s third argumentative 
strategy from noetic pluralism. I argue that James’s pragmatic method leads to noetic pluralism, that 
explanatory reductionism relies on an implicit commitment to noetic monism, and that if we therefore have 
reason to embrace noetic pluralism, we have reason to reject explanatory reductionism. 
2  Fruits or Manna? 
In “Religion and Neurology,” James introduces a distinction between “an existential judgment or 
proposition,” which concerns the “constitution, origin, and history” of the proposition and “a spiritual 
judgment” or “proposition of value” which concerns “its importance, meaning, or significance.”15 This 
distinction is important to observe, James says, because “questions of historical fact” do not answer 
questions about the use of a proposition “as a guide to life.”16 This is a mistake James thinks the medical 
materialist makes when he assumes that “spiritual value is undone if lowly origin be asserted.”17 According 
to James, medical materialism amounts to “a general way…of discrediting states of mind for which we 
have an antipathy…by calling them ‘nothing but’ expressions of our organic dispositions.”18 For example, 
a medical materialist may attempt to criticize “the religious emotions by showing a connexion between 
them and the sexual life” or by attributing “mental over-tensions…to the perverted action of various glands 
which physiology will yet discover.”19 
According to James, the problem with this view is that if we assume “as a convenient hypothesis that 
the dependence of mental states upon bodily conditions [is] thorough-going and complete,” then “scientific 
theories are organically conditioned just as much as religious emotions.”20 Thus, “when we think certain 
states of mind [are] superior to others,” it is not “because of what we know concerning their organic 
antecedents.”21 Instead we must appeal to “the general principles by which…empirical philosophy has 
always contended that we must be guided [by] in our search for truth.”22 This is the “empiricist criterion” 
that has always been at work in “the history of Christian mysticism:” the criterion that “[b]y their fruits ye 
shall know them, not by their roots.”23 Given this distinction, James suggests the medical materialists are 
making a category mistake. They appeal to the wrong sort of reason when attempting to dispute the claim 
that a religious experience is veridical, or an honest encounter with sacred reality. 
As Proudfoot has observed, James’s strategy here amounts to an attempt to separate “questions of 
origin and questions of evaluation…in the study of religious experience.”24 In this sense, James employs 
what Proudfoot calls a protective strategy, or an attempt to protect religious experience from the reach of 
15 James, Varieties, 13. 
16 Ibid., 14. 
17 Ibid., 17. 
18 Ibid., 19. 
19 Ibid., 19-20. 
20 Ibid., 20. 
21 Ibid., 21. 
22 Ibid., 23-4. 
23 Ibid., 25. 
24 Proudfoot, Religious, 169. 
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scientific explanation by suggesting that its claims can only be evaluated in terms inimical to scientific 
explanation.25 For Proudfoot, the problem with this strategy is that experiences have “the epistemic status 
of hypotheses.”26 In any experience, there is a “noetic quality.”27 This quality involves “an embedded claim 
about the cause or origin of the perceptual experience.”28 But then this means that “matters of assessment 
and explanation cannot be kept as clearly distinct as [James] would like.”29 
Proudfoot’s view is that James’s treatment of religious experience in Varieties involves a sort of ham-
fisted anti-reductionist position. In Proudfoot’s view, many “warnings against reductionism in the study of 
religion conflate descriptive and explanatory reduction.”30 As Proudfoot defines it, descriptive reduction 
involves “the failure to identify an emotion, practice, or experience under the description by which the 
subject identifies it.”31 Explanatory, or theoretical reduction, on the other hand, “consists in offering an 
explanation of an experience in terms that are not those of the subject and that might not meet with his 
approval.”32 The problem with descriptive reduction is that it can misidentify the experience.33 For Proudfoot, 
an “experience must be identified under a description that can be ascribed to the subject at the time of the 
experience.”34 Yet this doesn’t itself rule out the possibility that the best explanation of that description 
will not vindicate the embedded claim about the cause of the experience. Therefore, the inadmissibility of 
descriptive reduction in the study of religious experience doesn’t reveal the inadmissibility of explanatory 
reduction in that study. 
Insofar as James’s protective strategy neglects the embedded etiological claims in religious experiences, 
Proudfoot can easily charge James with an improper use of descriptive reduction in his own treatment of 
these experiences. That this objection can be made against James shows how unstable James’s distinction 
between existential and spiritual judgments actually is. For one thing, the distinction is quite out of step 
with the radical empiricist philosophy James will go on to develop. Radical empiricism, as James explains, 
suggests that “the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters 
of direct particular experience…[as] the things themselves.”35 For James, these conjunctions can be either 
conjunctions of copresence or conjunctions of succession.36 But if that’s the case, then, any experiential 
episode should involve some awareness of where the experience has come from, and that, as Proudfoot 
notices, brings etiological considerations into play. Second, the distinction between fruits and roots 
involves a quite unhelpful idealization of the concept of fruit. A fruit is something that grows from roots, 
not something without them. 
This is something James should have appreciated given his comments about the hypothesis of “the 
dependence of mental states upon bodily conditions.”37 As James observed, this dependence, if true, 
would make all experience conditioned by organic conditions. So, one cannot make a judgment about 
the veridicality of an experience merely by pointing to these conditions. But then James doesn’t need to 
distinguish between fruits and roots in this context.38 He can simply point out that these organic conditions 
25 Ibid., 199. 
26 Ibid., 163. 
27 Ibid., 169. 
28 Ibid., 176. 
29 Ibid., 169. 
30 Ibid., 198. 
31 Ibid., 196. 
32 Ibid., 197. 
33 Ibid.,  234. 
34 Ibid., 218.
35 James, Meaning, 173. 
36 In a footnote in Some Problems of Philosophy, James says that “[a]lmost no philosopher has admitted that perception can 
give us relations immediately” but he refers readers to Bergson, “Prof. James Ward in his Naturalism and Agnosticism” and his 
own A Pluralistic Universe for exceptions to this pattern (James, Some, 110).
37 James, Varieties, 20. 
38 James uses the distinction between fruits and roots to draw attention to several things, including a distinction between 
foundationalism and pragmatism. My point here is just that James is wrong to map this distinction onto the distinction between 
existential and spiritual judgments. 
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amount to shared roots, and therefore these conditions cannot alone demonstrate that an alleged experience 
is not veridical. Of course, this move is not quite decisive against medical materialism. That’s because the 
medical materialist can hold out hope that a more fine-grained analysis of organic conditions might reliably 
help distinguish between veridical and non-veridical experiences. Something near to this suggestion has 
been made in the case of evolutionary debunking arguments in the cognitive science of religion, as we will 
see in the next section. 
3  The Roots of Religious Experience 
In his discussion of medical materialism, James grants the notion that mental states are dependent on 
bodily conditions. He then suggests that this fact can’t count in favor of either a religious or scientific belief. 
I suggested that this leaves open the possibility that a finer discrimination between bodily conditions could 
help distinguish veridical from non-veridical experiences. However, in “Religion and Neurology” James 
suggests otherwise. He suggests that we may someday know “the facts intimately enough” that we can see 
“‘the liver’…alter[ing] in one way the blood that percolates it” such that the result is “the [M]ethodist [and] 
in another way…the atheist form of mind.”39 Yet it’s hard to see how this admission helps James’s case. If the 
percolation of blood associated with the Methodist form of mind was associated with routine mathematical 
error, while the alteration associated with the atheist form of mind was associated with mathematical 
genius, that might be reason to treat the Methodist form of mind with suspicion. His distorted understanding 
of fruits has clearly caused him to stumble here. And if we look to contemporary cognitive science of religion 
and some evolutionary debunking arguments in philosophy of religion, we can quickly come to appreciate 
attempts to identify unreliable physiological processes associated with religious experience. 
Consider, for example, the hypothesized hyperactive agency detection device (HADD). According to 
Evolutionary Psychologist Justin Barrett, agency detection was important in the evolutionary past because 
it helped prey avoid predators.40 Insofar as it is more costly to fail to detect a predator than to falsely detect a 
predator, it’s reasonable to think that a strong predisposition to agency detection would be selected for and 
preserved throughout evolutionary history. This would mean that contemporary agents stand to inherit this 
predisposition, and this implies that contemporary agents are prone to falsely detect agents where there 
are none. This could clearly be the case with respect to various religious experiences. Thus, HADD supports 
the claim that “people acquire their supernatural beliefs because the mechanism by means of which they 
detect agents is prone to hyperactivity.”41 
Consider also Bering’s Existential Theory of Mind (EToM) proposal.42 According to this proposal, 
religious belief is explained by an overactive utilization of Theory of Mind (ToM). A Theory of Mind enables 
sufficiently complex cognitive actors to postulate the existence of other minds, specifically intentional 
states, where a meaningful event occurs. For example, the sight of someone pointing in one direction would 
lead one to believe that this person has a conscious attentive interest in something in that direction. Clearly, 
this is a quite useful skill in social contexts, and so it’s reasonable to think that a strong predisposition 
to ToM would be selected for and preserved throughout evolutionary history, at least in the case of social 
creatures. Again, this would mean that contemporary agents stand to inherit this predisposition and that 
contemporary agents may be prone to falsely posit intentional states where there are none. According to 
EToM, religious belief is a result of people positing the intentional states of “a greater mind, or ultimate 
meaning-giver” where an apparently meaningful event occurs.43  
Keeping these theories in mind,44 we can revisit James’s suggestion that an elucidation of organic 
conditions cannot undermine religious experience. One way to read James here is to suggest that James 
39 James, Varieties, 20-1. 
40 Barrett, Why?
41 Van Eyghen, “Is supernatural,” 127.
42 Bering, “The existential.” 
43 Van Eyghen, “Is supernatural,” 128. 
44 For other CSR theories, see Boyer, Religion and Johnson, God. 
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is committed to the genetic fallacy: the view that questions of etiology are irrelevant to questions 
regarding the philosophical value of an experience. This is an example of what I earlier described as the 
first argumentative route in “Religion and Neurology.” Having already dispatched this route, we are now 
considering the suggestion that the sharing of etiological roots does not lead to any substantive conclusions 
about the veridicality of an experience. I have suggested that this is a quite plausible claim, but as the 
preceding two theories demonstrate, this claim leaves room for a finer discrimination of the etiology of an 
experience to undermine the veridicality of that experience. 
Take James’s throwaway suggestion that one type of blood percolation in the liver is associated with 
the Methodist form of mind and another type of percolation is associated with the atheist form of mind. 
Suppose now that evolutionary cognitive scientists have correlated HADD with the Methodist form of 
blood percolation.  Suppose further that the informant James references in “The Reality of the Unseen” 
who one night “felt…a presence in the room” they could not “better describe [than as] a consciousness of 
a spiritual presence” is a Methodist.45 In this case, HADD may very well imply that the experience was not 
veridical. That’s because the HADD hypothesis would lead this informant to think the experience was due 
to something other than the perception of an actual spiritual presence. And in recounting their experience, 
James’s informant admits that “[t]his may provoke a smile.”46 Of course, this informant wasn’t aware of 
the HADD hypothesis, but this claim is nonetheless an indication that they were not absolutely certain 
that the experience was veridical, and that they were open to the possibility that a claim to veridicality 
could be undermined. Thus, it’s perfectly reasonable to think that the HADD hypothesis in this case casts 
considerable doubt on the veridicality of this informant’s experience. 
Of course, this conclusion may yet be too hasty. There may be some concrete detail of the experience that 
the informant might insist that the HADD hypothesis doesn’t account for. Consider the series of encounters 
James’s friend describes in this same chapter.47 In this case, the informant describes three different 
experiences of an unseen presence: one, “a vivid tactile hallucination of being grasped by the arm,” two, a 
sudden feeling of “something come into the room” and remain “a minute or two,” and three, an awareness 
“of the actual presence (though not the coming) of the thing that was there the night before.”48 Suppose that 
this informant was then faced with the HADD hypothesis. This informant might not judge the hypothesis to 
adequately account for the tactile hallucinations of being grasped by the arm. Or perhaps they might judge 
the hypothesis to account for this hallucination, but not for the way the presence lingered in the room. Of 
course, we might combine the HADD and EToM hypotheses and suggest the existence of something like a 
HADD-EToM loop. This view would have HADD triggered by an occurrence occasionally associated with the 
actual presence of an agent and then activate an EToM process that searches for subsequent meaningful 
events. The perception of these events would then prime a subject to expect the presence of an agent 
thereby retriggering HADD, and this might re-engage EToM processes, and then the process could repeat. 
This would create a HADD-EToM loop. Perhaps this loop hypothesis can account for the experience. But 
notice that this hypothesized loop is quite extended across time. In the previous case mentioned above, the 
informant describes “immediately [feeling] a consciousness of a presence in the room.”49 Faced with this 
loop hypothesis, a person who had an experience of this sort might judge the hypothesis to significantly 
distort their experience. If so, this loop hypothesis might not undermine the veridicality of the experience. 
Nonetheless, the preceding demonstrates that it is certainly possible to give a genealogical and/or 
etiological account that undermines the claim that an experience was veridical.50 James’s suggestion that 
the etiological roots of an experience do not lead to any substantive conclusions about the veridicality of 
an experience when those roots are shared with other experiences one does not suspect are non-veridical is 
open to the response that the sharing of these roots is only partial. This is what the evolutionary debunking 
45 James, Varieties, 58.
46 Ibid. 
47 James, Varieties, 55. 
48 Ibid., 56. 
49 Ibid., 58. 
50 See also McBrayer, “The Epistemology.” 
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arguments inspired by work in CSR attempt to do. Of course, those arguments might fail for many reasons.51 
One possible reason is that the advocates of these arguments fail to note how little the CSR theories address 
first-person experience.52 Thus, there is little alternative to getting in the weeds, examining concrete 
instances of religious experience, and investigating whether a cognitive scientific account can adequately 
capture the details of the experience. No one who regards a religious experience as veridical needs to regard 
all alleged experiences as veridical. One can accept the claim that some CSR theories cast doubt on the 
veridicality of some religious experiences. However, it may seem that our arrival at this conclusion has 
left James and Varieties behind. In the next section, I argue that this is not the case and that the third 
argumentative strategy James develops in “Religion and Neurology” supports a case for continuing to regard 
many religious experiences as veridical when explanations that do not necessarily regard the experience as 
veridical are available and applicable to that experience. 
4  The Case from Noetic Pluralism 
Debunking arguments appealing to theories in CSR require these theories to muster more experimental 
support than they have thus far gathered. However, a debunking argument doesn’t require CSR at all. 
Consider, for example, Proudfoot’s sociohistorical approach to religious experience. As Proudfoot describes 
it, this approach involves a “historical understanding” and “natural explanation” of religious experience.53 
This approach may be consistent with regarding experiences as veridical.54 Nonetheless, suppose one 
wanted to construct a debunking argument motivated by this approach rather than the theories of CSR. 
Such an advocate would not need to hold out hope that the cognitive scientists of the future will be able 
to discriminate between truth-producing and delusion-producing physiological or cognitive states. They 
could argue that sociohistorical explanation does not need to posit the veridicality of an experience, and 
that this suggests the experience is not veridical. The question is whether this follows. I think not. Such a 
view assumes that one explanatory practice is best and/or exhaustive, but this is the position James’s case 
against medical materialism targets. In this way, “Religion and Neurology” contains a case for defusing 
debunking attempts motivated by a commitment to a form of explanatory reductionism. I will explain. 
In developing his case against medical materialism, James says that when “we think of certain states 
of mind [as] superior to others…[i]t is either because we take an immediate delight in them; or…because we 
believe them to bring us good consequential fruits for life.”55 Yet how James cashes out these fruits is quite 
revealing. He says that it is “the character of inner happiness…which stamps them as good, or else their 
consistency with our other opinions and their serviceability for our needs.”56 Though he quickly returns 
to a discussion of “spiritual judgments,” he says that here “immediate luminousness,” or “philosophical 
reasonableness, and moral helpfulness are the only available criteria.”57 Thus, James says, “we are thrown 
back upon the general principles by which the empirical philosophy has always contended that we must 
be guided in our search for truth.”58 In emphasizing the need for principles (in the plural) and connecting 
these to his metaphor of fruits, it is clear that James is introducing a pluralistic approach to evaluation. He 
51 As Peels et al note, “no theory in the Cognitive Science of Religion can be regarded as established” (206). See also Jong, 
Kavanaugh & Visala “Born Idolaters”, Jong & Visala, “Evolutionary debunking”, Marsh & Marsh, “The explanatory” and Van 
Leeuwen & Van Elk, “Seeking.” See Plantinga, Where and Barrett & Church, “Should CSR” for a case that some commitments of 
CSR render atheism internally incoherent. See Braddock “An Evidential” for an argument to the effect that the confirmation of 
CSR theories would be a boon for religious believers not their critics. 
52 For a discussion of the scope of CSR theories, see White, “What?” 
53 Proudfoot, “Pragmatism”, 45. 
54 For example, one way of interpreting Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory approach to social science is as a radical 
empiricist counter to the debunking efforts of neo-Kantian or Durkheimian sociology Latour suggests amount to borderline 
conspiracy theories. See Latour, Reassembling the Social, 160. 
55 James, Varieties, 21. 
56 Ibid., 21-2. 
57 Ibid., 23. 
58 Ibid., 23-4. 
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here appeals to the need for clear thoughts, to coherence, or “consistency with…other opinions,” to moral 
serviceability, and to responsiveness to other needs. In a 1908 article published in Philosophical Review 
entitled “The Pragmatic Account of Truth and its Misunderstanders,” James reinforces this pluralism and 
expressly says that true ideas “must point to or lead towards…reality [and]…yield…such satisfactions (in 
the plural) as concretely existing men actually do find in their beliefs.”59 This is why James says medical 
materialism is “a good appellation for the too simple-minded system of thought which we are considering.”60 
It’s also why James describes medical materialists as “so many belated dogmatists” who make etiological 
considerations the “admirable criterion” of truth.61 Of course, James describes his own view as appealing 
to “our empiricist criterion” as well, but his goal here is to construct a method for managing a plurality of 
desiderata, as the metaphor of fruits indicates.62 
In this way James’s pluralism is not only evaluative, but noetic.63 James erred in overstating the 
distinction between existential and spiritual judgments, but in doing so he also implicitly acknowledged 
a distinction between genealogy and intervention, and between one knowledge practice and another. 
Thus, when James went to compose Pragmatism a few years later, he put the notion of leading at the core 
of his account of truth to account for both success within a knowledge practice and between knowledge 
practices.64 For instance, James says the pragmatic notion of truth is “essentially bound up with the way in 
which one moment in our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be worth while to 
have been led to.”65 This is a view that James says “force[s] us to be friendly” to “the hypothesis of noetic 
pluralism,” “to the pluralistic view” that “the widest field of knowledge…still contains some ignorance.”66 
Thus, James says that “no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality,” but that “any one of them may from 
some point of view be useful.”67 
However, if pragmatism is to account for successful shifting from one knowledge practice to another, 
James realized he needed an account of how this was possible. For James, radical empiricism plays this 
role. This is one reason why James says, “the pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first-rate importance in 
making radical empiricism prevail.”68 That theory has it that truth consists in the leading of one moment 
to other moments where a plurality of evaluative desiderata are consistently satisfied. Of course, if that 
is to be the case, moments of experience need to stand in relation to one another. Fortunately, this is 
exactly what James calls the “generalized conclusion” of radical empiricism: “that…the parts of experience 
hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience.”69 This supports a 
commitment to noetic pluralism because this “concatenated or continuous” structure of experience is 
not the same within or between different practices.70 While James does allude to empiricism in “Religion 
and Neurology,” he doesn’t conceive radical empiricism as a mere refurbishing of Humean empiricism. As 
James says in Pragmatism, “Rationalism sticks to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external 
senses. Pragmatism is willing to take anything.”71 And as James notes in The Meaning of Truth, pragmatism 
leads to radical empiricism.72 Therefore, the relationship pragmatism and radical empiricism is not that of 
a Wittgensteinian ladder. James does not use pragmatism to establish radical empiricism and then drop the 
former. Radical empiricism presupposes pragmatism, and pragmatism requires coherence of commitments, 
59 James, Meaning, 270.
60 Ibid., 20. 
61 James, Varieties, 24, my emphasis in italics. 
62 Ibid., 25. 
63 See also Levinson, Religious Investigations. 
64 See Stepanenko, “A New Name.” 
65 James, Pragmatism, 98. 
66 Ibid., 81-2. 
67 James, Varieties, 33. 
68 James, Meaning, 172
69 Ibid., 173.
70 Ibid. 
71 James, Pragmatism, 44.
72 In this sense, radical empiricism is not just contrasted with Humean empiricism, but is conceived as a retread of Kant’s 
transcendental empiricism.  
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the correspondence of memories with actual events, the satisfaction of needs, and practical relevance for all 
claims. In this way, James integrates elements of coherentist, correspondence, virtue, and consequentialist 
epistemologies into his view. If we focus on radical empiricism and overlook James’s pragmatism, we might 
be tempted to interpret James as a noetic monist and miss this noetic pluralism. 
This oversight can be problematic because this commitment constitutes one of James’s important 
insights in “Religion and Neurology.” James’s case against medical materialism doesn’t rely solely on a 
protective strategy. James’s pragmatism is pitted against reductionism in general. Thus, James would be 
quite unmoved by an attempt to leverage Proudfoot’s distinction between descriptive and explanatory 
reductionism into a debunking case. For James, the adoption of any form of reductionism would just be the 
adoption of one particular point of view on a phenomenon. The important question will still be whether or 
not that point of view can account for the relevant concrete facts of the phenomenon. If the point of view 
cannot clearly do so, the explanation will not be viable, but even if one explanatory perspective accounts 
for the relevant facts, that still wouldn’t suffice to rule out the veridicality of the experience. To do that, 
one would need to suggest that other explanatory perspectives are not viable. But to do that, one would 
need to suggest that one explanatory practice is best and/or exhaustive and this is exactly what Jamesian 
pragmatism denies. That’s not to say James could not endorse a form of reductionism as useful, but that he 
would resist the attempt to leverage this utility in a debunking effort or other effort to preclude alternative 
explanations. 
To reinforce this conclusion, recall Proudfoot’s claim that “those who identify their experiences in 
religious terms are seeking the best explanations for what is happening to them.”73 In Proudfoot’s view, 
if these experiences are veridical, the religious believer should expect an explanation that takes those 
experiences to be actual encounters with the divine. However, James’s commitment to noetic pluralism 
also entails a commitment to perspectival pluralism. So, for James, an alternative explanation which does 
not involve any theistic appeals is not necessarily a rival explanation. Two explanations are only rival 
explanations if they purport to account for the same aspects of the same phenomenon, and at least one 
denies what the other claims. Consider one of the experiences of an unseen presence I described in the last 
section. The HADD hypothesis is tailored to account for the experience of this presence. It is an alternative 
to the hypothesis that the experience is veridical. The two explanations are rival explanations because they 
both attempt to account for the same aspect of the same experience, and one denies what the other claims. 
In this circumstance, one explanation is to be preferred over its rival only if that explanation accounts for 
its target better than the other. Thus, an experiential episode can only be regarded as non-veridical if the 
veridical hypothesis fares worse in this regard. 
Now, it might seem as if a religious experience can be dismissed as non-veridical in cases where the 
veridical and non-veridical hypothesis account for the episode equally well. The first thing to say about such 
cases is that they are probably rare. I suspect that the more we focus on the concrete details of an experiential 
episode, the less likely it will be that we find ourselves in a situation where two rival explanations fare equally 
well. Nonetheless, suppose there is such a case. On what grounds can the non-veridical hypothesis be preferred 
over its veridical rival? The typical move here is to appeal to parsimony considerations. The non-veridical 
explanation is supposed to be preferable insofar as it invokes fewer and syntactically simpler entities.74 But 
is that true? Consider a debunking case motivated by a view like Proudfoot’s. Proudfoot’s sociohistorical 
analysis, to be descriptively adequate, is going to have to account for the experiential details of the disputed 
episode. To account for these details, he must, therefore, appeal to a wide variety of sociohistorical cultural 
phenomena. The hypothesis that the episode is veridical is going to regard the experiential details as registers 
of something that actually, or mostly, happened. The hypothesis will thus have less of a need to appeal to 
the resources of 19th century liberal Protestantism, or contingencies in the Counter Reformation, or the state 
of Pauline interpretation in 17th century England, etc. Of course, the veridical hypothesis might also appeal 
to these resources, but insofar as the episode is regarded as veridical, the veridical hypothesis might appeal 
to fewer of these resources. All of this suggests that an identification of the simpler, more parsimonious 
73 Proudfoot, Religious, 227.
74 See, for example, Nola, “Demystifying”. 
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explanation is no straightforward task. James would hardly care. He says explicitly in Pragmatism that 
“profusion, not economy, may after all be reality’s key-note.”75 Of course, this is a view that James most 
explicitly formulates in his later philosophical writings, but his uneasiness in “Religion and Neurology” with 
“nothing but” explanations suggests that this commitment is at work in Varieties.76 
Perhaps there are other considerations debunkers might appeal to that put pressure on veridical 
interpretations of religious experience. One often invoked consideration is against hypotheses with 
untestable assumptions.77 Perhaps one response is that the veridical hypothesis rests on assumptions 
that are testable. Many philosophers have argued that religious experiences allow for a test of sanctity: if 
true, these experiences lead to reform in character, the accomplishment of tasks that were otherwise not 
accomplished, clarity of thought, and so on.78 These sorts of tests might not satisfy debunkers, but if noetic 
pluralism is true, there’s no reason to expect every claim to be testable in exactly the same way. Of course, 
the reductionist debunkers might suggest that at this point James and I are only inviting us to engage in a 
bit of intuition warfare, that we are merely pitting an intuitive commitment to noetic pluralism against the 
reductionist’s intuitive commitment to noetic monism. And it’s true that James does not quite secure a case 
for noetic pluralism in Varieties, but the good point he is implicitly making in “Religion and Neurology” is 
that the debunker is relying on an implicit commitment to noetic monism, and that they have not secured 
their case for noetic monism either. Thus, Proudfoot’s distinction between descriptive and explanatory 
reductionism is itself of little use in a debunking case, and James’s work in Varieties helps us see why. 
5  Conclusion 
I have argued that the critique of medical materialism James develops in “Religion and Neurology” cannot 
be dismissed on the grounds that it contains nothing more than an illicit strategy that protects religious 
experience from the reach of scientific explanation. While this is a dubious strategy, it is not the only or 
even the most important consideration to which James appeals in his case against medical materialism. 
Instead, I have argued that when we elucidate the most forceful considerations to which James appeals in 
Varieties, we not only have a case against medical materialism, but a case against debunking efforts reliant 
on explanatory reductionism in general. This is a case I have described as the case from noetic pluralism. 
According to this view, there are a plurality of knowledge practices, no practice can capture every aspect 
of a target phenomenon, and no claim made from within a particular practice can be ruled out unless 
it contradicts a claim made from within a separate practice that better accounts for the target aspects of 
the target phenomenon. Because any form of explanatory reductionism privileges a particular knowledge 
practice, the truth of noetic pluralism entails the rejection of explanatory reductionism. The preceding has 
admittedly not secured the case for noetic pluralism, but the primary contention is that the reductionist has 
not secured the case for noetic monism either. 
This is not to say that a form of explanatory reductionism cannot be useful, but that the complexity 
of experience is such that successful reduction need not amount to exhaustive description. Consider 
Proudfoot’s suggestion that “those who identify their experiences in religious terms are seeking the best 
explanations for what is happening to them.”79 If we are focused on the intuitive aim of “figuring out 
exactly what happened” we can focus on the contrast between veridical and non-veridical interpretation 
of the experience as Proudfoot does here, and this focus is acceptable enough. The problem is that this 
focus can obfuscate the possibility of a multiplicity of veridical or even non-veridical interpretations of 
75 James, Pragmatism, 93. This doesn’t mean a Jamesian cannot accept the leaner of two theories (if one can be discerned) 
on pragmatic grounds. A leaner theory can do more work, be more beautiful, inform practical interventions better and so be 
preferred on these grounds. It’s just that if we reject parsimony as an intellectual, aesthetical, moral or practical ideal, we 
cannot prefer a leaner theory just because it is leaner. 
76 James, Varieties, 19.
77 See, for example, Nola “Demystifying”. 
78 See Van Eyghen, “Is supernatural”, and Alston, Perceiving. 
79 Proudfoot, Religious, 227.
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the experience. One could generate poetic descriptions, prosaic descriptions, pictorial descriptions, etc. 
of the same experience, each description could suggest that the experience was veridical, and yet each 
can amount to a somewhat different description of the same experience.80 The Jamesian view is that these 
descriptions can be true concurrently. I have suggested that this view relies on an implicit commitment 
to noetic pluralism and that this commitment is plausible. If so, knowledge practices that suggest an 
experience was veridical can coexist with practices that do not assume or imply that the experience was 
veridical. In these cases, the absence of a veridical judgment of an experience in one practice need not 
necessarily undermine the presence of a veridical judgment in another practice. To suggest otherwise 
is not just to embrace explanatory reductionism, but noetic monism. If we have reason to accept noetic 
pluralism, we have reason to resist this suggestion or any suggestion that alternative explanations are not 
available and/or viable. Therefore, an acceptance of noetic pluralism entails the rejection of explanatory 
reductionism as a method of accounting for religious experience, whether we take that reduction to suggest 
an experience is veridical or not. 
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